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Abstract—This paper presents a new encryption scheme im-
plemented at the physical layer of wireless networks employing
orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM). The new
scheme obfuscates the subcarriers by randomly reserving several
subcarriers for dummy data and resequences the training symbol
by a new secure sequence. Subcarrier obfuscation renders the
OFDM transmission more secure and random, while training
symbol resequencing protects the entire physical layer packet,
but does not affect the normal functions of synchronization and
channel estimation of legitimate users while preventing eaves-
droppers from performing these functions. The security analysis
shows the system is robust to various attacks by analyzing the
search space using an exhaustive key search. Our scheme is
shown to have a better performance in terms of search space, key
rate and complexity in comparison with other OFDM physical
layer encryption schemes. The scheme offers options for users
to customize the security level and key rate according to the
hardware resource. Its low complexity nature also makes the
scheme suitable for resource limited devices. Details of practical
design considerations are highlighted by applying the approach
to an IEEE 802.11 OFDM system case study.
Index Terms—Communication system security, wireless net-
works, OFDM, physical layer, cryptography
I. INTRODUCTION
The broadcast nature of wireless communications means
that anyone within the physical communication range of a
transmitter can receive the signal and potentially decode the
transmissions. Therefore, wireless network security has been
an important research area. Under the open systems intercon-
nection (OSI) model, communication systems are partitioned
into different protocol layers, such as physical layer, data link
layer, etc. Communication security is conventionally handled
by applying cryptographic schemes in upper layers (data link
layer and above) [1], [2]. For example, Wi-Fi protected access
(WPA) [3], [4] is designed to protect the media access control
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(MAC) layer, a sublayer of data link layer; transport layer
security (TLS) protocol [5] is used to secure transport layer.
Although upper layer cryptography greatly improves the
network security, wireless transmission still suffers from
eavesdropping because these security mechanisms are imple-
mented as independent functions in the communications proto-
col layers operating above the physical transmission [6]. This
results in several vulnerabilities. For example, the underlying
structures of user’s data packet, such as the MAC address,
are not encrypted and research has shown that it is possible
to discover users’ identities and the destinations/sources of
their message [7]. This permits passive and active attacks,
e.g., the attacker can analyze the network traffic by inter-
preting the MAC address and launch denial of service (DoS)
attacks by flooding the legitimate receiver [8]. In addition, the
physical layer header is transmitted in plaintext, which allows
the eavesdropper to synchronize the wireless transmission,
thus permitting the transmitted frames to be easily recovered
(sniffed) and decrypted off-line.
In order to combat passive eavesdropping, a growing interest
in moving the encryption to the physical layer has emerged
to enhance the security of the wireless transmission [8]–[14],
which is termed physical layer encryption (PLE) in this paper.
It is implementable and can be offered as a complement to
upper layer cryptographic schemes to enhance security of
wireless communication.
PLE differs from physical layer security (PLS) schemes,
which aim to achieve information-theoretic security by exploit-
ing channel characteristics but not by encryption (see [15], [16]
and references therein). For example, PLS can be achieved
by introducing artificial noise [17], beamforming [18], and
cooperative relay [19], etc. However, when it comes to the
practical realization, there are many challenges such as com-
plex implementation and unavailable eavesdroppers’ channel
state information [20], which prevent PLS schemes from
protecting the commercial wireless systems.
Unlike upper layer encryption schemes, PLE schemes
are closely related to the wireless communications medium
through using different schemes to vary the ways of mod-
ulating the data. Orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing
(OFDM) is one of the most popular wireless techniques due
to its high spectral efficiency, robustness against inter-symbol
interference (ISI) and fading, and efficient implementation.
For many of these reasons, it has been adopted in wireless
standards such as IEEE 802.11 a/g/n, IEEE 802.16 WiMAX,
LTE, etc. Research has sought to improve the OFDM security
level by employing PLE, such as constellation scrambling in
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2the frequency domain [8]–[10], data scrambling in the time
domain [11], modulation symbols rotation [12], and noise en-
hanced constellation rotation [13], [14]. Whilst these schemes
all make an OFDM system more secure, they have high key-
to-data ratios which increase the computational complexity
of the hardware design. Moreover in almost all of these
schemes, the training symbol is sent in plaintext which permits
eavesdroppers to easily recover the transmitted frames for
subsequent decryption.
In this paper, a much more robust OFDM PLE scheme
is proposed whereby the transmitted packets are completely
unobservable to eavesdroppers. Our scheme involves subcar-
rier obfuscation and training symbol resequencing (SOTSR),
which is a totally different approach from other methods.
Obfuscation is achieved by reserving several OFDM subcar-
riers to transmit dummy data to randomize the encrypted
data streams. Unlike other OFDM PLE schemes, the training
symbol is resequenced to prevent an eavesdropper from syn-
chronizing and estimating the channel to recover the physical
frames. Thus, protection of the entire physical layer packet
is achieved. Whilst the scheme is designed to be generically
applicable to OFDM systems, an IEEE 802.11 OFDM protocol
has been used as a case study. Our main contributions are:
 Obfuscation of the data at the subcarrier level by the
transmission of dummy data in several OFDM subcarriers
in order to make the data more random and secure.
This also permits dynamic adjustment of the encryption
parameters in order to customize the security level of a
connection.
 Replacement of the training symbol with a more secure
key sequence provides a new unique training symbol
as the conventional training symbol will be resequenced
in a way unknown to eavesdroppers, thus preventing
them from synchronizing and estimating the channel.
Legitimate users are still able to perform these functions
normally, but eavesdroppers cannot locate and decode the
data correctly. The feasibility and performance of training
symbol resequencing is analyzed for the example of the
IEEE 802.11 OFDM system.
 The scheme is designed to be much less computation-
ally complex and thus particularly suitable for resource
limited devices as the key rate can be varied to match
hardware resources. It is usually low for most encryption
parameters but here the security can be scaled according
to the resource availability.
 A case study has been carried out by implementing the
scheme according to IEEE 802.11 OFDM. We provide
indications on how to interact with the existing modules
in a communication protocol and how to apply effective
protection to different data parts according to their spe-
cific structures and functions in the protocol.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section II in-
troduces related work. Section III describes our OFDM PLE
algorithm. A security analysis of the proposed scheme is
presented in Section IV and a comparison with other OFDM
PLE schemes is carried out in Section V by comparing them in
terms of search space, key rate and complexity. A case study,
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Fig. 1. Encryption schemes and security attacks. (i), (ii), and (iii) are different
fields protected by MAC layer encryption schemes, most PLE schemes and
our PLE scheme, respectively; n and x is key-to-data ratio for other PLE
schemes and our scheme, respectively. The security analysis of these three
attacks is presented in Section IV.
implementation in IEEE 802.11 OFDM system, is presented
in Section VI. Section VII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Traditionally encryption is carried out at the MAC layer
and above. As shown in Fig. 1, only the MAC data field
(indicated by (i) in the diagram) is protected by the MAC
layer encryption schemes and therefore cannot prevent passive
and active attacks which target the MAC address as it is unen-
crypted. Moreover, MAC layer encryption does not prevent an
eavesdropper from storing the data and decrypting it off-line.
In order to address these vulnerabilities, it appears necessary
to enhance security at the physical layer to protect data field
(ii) or even (iii) indicated in Fig. 1.
Various OFDM PLE schemes have been proposed, which
perform encryption in different stages of the physical layer.
Tseng and Chiu [9], Khan et al. [8] and Zhang et al.
[10] implement PLE by scrambling the constellation symbols
in the frequency domain before the IFFT operation, whilst
Li et al. [11] scrambles the data in the time domain after
the IFFT operation. Dzung [12] adds rotation to the modu-
lation symbols and encrypts the training symbol to prevent
the attacker from synchronizing and estimating the channel.
Ma et al. [13] and Reilly and Kanter [14], also encrypt
the constellation symbols by converting to a much denser
constellation; they introduce a small amount of random noise
into each constellation symbol, making it more difficult for an
adversary to demodulate the ciphertext.
These schemes have all acted to make OFDM transmission
more secure, however, they still have limitations. Firstly, all
the schemes encrypt one source data bit with one or more
key bits; in the work of Reilly and Kanter [14], eight key bits
per symbol are required for encryption and so the key-to-data
ratio is always n (n  1). The key bits are generated by a
key generator, which uses a stream cipher or a chaotic map
to generate the pseudorandom key sequence. The key-to-data
ratio is a major factor when comparing encryption schemes
for high data rate communications, because a higher speed
key generator will generally be much more computational
complex.
In addition, as shown in Fig. 1, most of the research [8]–
[11], [13], [14] transmits the training symbol in plaintext
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Fig. 2. Training symbol structures. The solid gray dots represent training
symbol.
which allows an eavesdropper to perform synchronization and
channel estimation just as legitimate users do. This means that
the data is sniffable as the eavesdropper is then able to locate
the data field in the recovered frame which has been the major
issue with conventional OFDM PLE schemes. Dzung [12]
encrypts both the training and data symbols by rotating them,
but the author does not analyze the feasibility and performance
in detail.
Several papers have proposed improving the security level
by scrambling the data symbols in either the frequency or
time domain [8]–[11]. This approach requires matrix oper-
ations: multiplication, determinant calculation and division,
all of which introduce additional computational complexity
which makes these schemes unattractive for low computation
capability devices.
In this paper, a novel PLE scheme for OFDM systems
is proposed, which makes the transmission more random by
obfuscating the data at the subcarrier level and protecting the
entire physical layer packet (iii) by resequencing the training
symbol. The scheme has low complexity and the key-to-data
ratio (x in Fig. 1) can be varied and usually made to be less
than 1.
III. SUBCARRIER OBFUSCATION AND TRAINING SYMBOL
RESEQUENCING SCHEME
A. Overview
In OFDM systems, the binary data is first coded and
interleaved, then mapped to a complex data point, X(n), by a
mapping scheme, such as BPSK, QPSK, 16-QAM, 64-QAM,
etc.. The complex data X(n) is finally modulated to different
subcarriers by IFFT operation, which can be written as
x(i) =
1
NIFFT
NIFFT 1X
n=0
X(n)ej2ni=NIFFT ; (1)
where NIFFT is the IFFT size, x(i); i = 0; 1; ::; NIFFT 1 forms
a time domain OFDM symbol.
An OFDM system consists of data symbol and training
symbol. The data symbol is modulated to transmit data while
the training symbol is used for the synchronization and channel
estimation. The training symbol may form a separate OFDM
symbol, or be combined with the data symbol, depending on
the training symbol structure, which is shown in Fig. 2.
The received signal in the frequency domain can be written
as
R(n) = X(n)H(n) +W (n); (2)
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Fig. 3. Illustration of the data unit (a) Example of the data unit structure
(s = 2); (b) Example of the dummy data subcarrier obfuscation (s = 2,
k = 3)
where H(n) and W (n) are the channel and noise effect,
respectively. The decoded signal can be written as
bX(n) = R(n)bH(n) ; (3)
where bH(n) is the channel estimation.
In this paper, we propose to enhance the OFDM systems’
security performance at the physical layer. The data part
is randomized at the subcarrier level by reserving several
subcarriers for dummy data transmission, i.e., some of the
X(n) are selected to obfuscate the data, as shown in Fig. 3. In
addition, the training symbol is resequenced with a secure and
random sequence. The entire physical layer packet of OFDM
transmission is thus protected by subcarrier obfuscation and
training symbol resequencing.
As the encryption information is shared between the le-
gitimate users, the receiver can decode the signal as normal.
However, an eavesdropper will be faced with significant chal-
lenges to decode the signal. First, as the training symbol is
resequenced and kept secret to the eavesdropper, he/she cannot
perform the synchronization and channel estimation correctly,
i.e., bH(n) remains unknown to the eavesdropper. In addition,
even though the eavesdropper could possibly get the channel
estimation bH(n), after equalization, he/she would also have
to remove the dummy data from bX(n) in order to reveal the
real source data, and this requires further knowledge of the
dummy reservation scheme being used at any time.
Fig. 4 shows the system block diagram of our proposed
scheme. The white blocks represent the generic OFDM system
and the gray blocks are added for encryption and decryption
in our scheme. The same key generator with the stream cipher
implemented inside is used in the transmitter and receiver to
generate the key sequence. As the seed and [s; k] for the key
generator are shared before the transmission using a secure
channel, the transmitter and receiver can generate the same key
sequence. These secret information, i.e., seed and [s; k], can
be refreshed by the users according to the channel condition
and security level that they intend to achieve.
B. Data Encryption and Subcarrier Obfuscation
1) Algorithm Description: The data part is encrypted and
obfuscated in order to make the OFDM data symbols more
random and secure. The source binary data is usually coded
with a coding rate, R, and interleaved, and then modulated
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Fig. 4. The block diagram of the proposed OFDM PLE system. The gray blocks are added for encryption and decryption.
using a mapping scheme. The modulated complex pointsX(n)
are then passed to the IFFT module to form an OFDM symbol.
The data with ld bits can be modulated into
NOFDM = d ld
NdRb
e (4)
OFDM symbols, where Nd is the number of the data subcar-
riers, b is the number of bits per subcarrier, determined by the
mapping scheme, and de is the ceiling function.
We propose to encrypt the source data and obfuscate them
by inserting dummy data in between the encrypted data. As
the source data usually can be modulated over many OFDM
symbols, we group s OFDM symbols as a data unit and
reserve k subcarriers for dummy data, which is called an [s; k]
combination. An example of data unit structure and dummy
data subcarrier obfuscation with s = 2, k = 3 is shown in
Fig. 3. The locations of the dummy data subcarriers change
for every data unit. Algorithm 1 describes the procedure for
data encryption and subcarrier obfuscation applied to the data
part.
The source data is first padded with zeros to the length
of Nunit(Nds   k)Rb bits (line 3) and then the new data is
divided into Nunit data groups, each of which has a length of
(Nds  k)Rb bits (line 4).
For each data group, kb key bits and k dummy data
subcarriers’ locations (each with a length of dlog2(Nds)e)
are generated by a stream cipher SC1 and kb dummy data
bits are generated by another stream cipher SC2, in line 6, 7,
and 8, respectively. In line 9, the data subcarriers’ locations
are generated by calculating the complementary set of dummy
data subcarriers’ locations. The key is expanded by replication
to the length of the data group in line 10 and then XOR-ed
with i-th data group in line 11.
Channel coding is usually adopted to correct wireless trans-
mission errors. Therefore, if dummy data insertion occurs
Algorithm 1 Data encryption and subcarrier obfuscation
INPUT: data, seed, [s; k], b, R
OUTPUT: dataenc
1: ld = length(data)
2: Nunit = d ld(Nds k)Rbe
3: data = pad(data; Nunit(Nds  k)Rb)
4: [data1; :::; datai; :::; dataNunit ] = data
5: for i 1 to Nunit do
6: key = SC1(seed; kb)
7: DummySubcLoc = SC1(seed; kdlog2(Nds)e)
8: DummyData = SC2(seed2; kb)
9: DataSubcLoc = [1 : Nds]  DummySubcLoc
10: key2 = expand(key) % key2 = [key; :::; key]
11: data2 = xor(datai,key2)
12: datacod = coding(data2; R)
13: dataint = interleave(dataconv)
14: dataenc(DataSubcLoc) = dataint
15: dataenc(DummySubcLoc) = DummyData
16: dataenc is passed to the remaining modules for further
processing
17: end for
before coding, then the dummy data will be mixed with the
data after coding and cannot be allocated to the specified
subcarriers. In addition, the interleaver will permute the data
so the dummy data will not be in the same subcarrier even
if it is not encoded. Therefore, coding and interleaving are
implemented before the dummy data insertion. The data unit
is finally formed by allocating the encrypted data group and
dummy data to their specified locations and then passed to the
remaining modules for further processing.
After mapping, the data bits and dummy data bits are
mapped to different subcarriers. Thus the data subcarriers are
obfuscated by dummy data subcarriers, making the OFDM
5symbols random and presenting a challenge for the eavesdrop-
per to sniff the data. Therefore OFDM symbols are encrypted
and obfuscated at the subcarrier level.
At the receiver side, the dummy data is removed before the
decoding, so that it will not affect the decoding of the en-
crypted data. Therefore seed2 is only generated in transmitter
and does not need to be shared between the legitimate users.
Because k subcarriers are reserved to transmit the dummy
data in every s OFDM symbols, the data throughput is
decreased by
 =
k
Nds
: (5)
In this paper, our scheme offers the potenial to make a trade-
off between the data throughput and security.
2) Benefits of Subcarrier Obfuscation: We obfuscate the
OFDM transmission at the subcarrier level by insertion of the
dummy data. This randomizes the analog waveform which
makes it much harder for the eavesdropper to decode the
signal. In addition, the subcarrier selection and dummy data
insertion are feasible in hardware as the operations required are
implementable and low cost. Finally, due to the introduction
of the encryption parameters, the system’s security level can
be adjusted according to the hardware availability and security
requirements. These benefits will be further discussed in detail
through the rest of the paper.
C. Training Symbol Resequencing
The training symbol in OFDM standards is pre-defined se-
quences used to perform the time synchronization and channel
estimation. For example, the long training symbol (LTS) used
in IEEE 802.11 OFDM is defined as
LTS = f1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1;
  1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1;
1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1;
  1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1g: (6)
Most OFDM PLE schemes use the same training symbol
defined in the standard. However, the eavesdropper also has
access to these sequences and then is able to synchronize to
the transmitter and estimate the channel, which means he/she
can decode and store the data for off-line decryption.
In order to enhance the security level of the OFDM system,
we propose to resequence the training symbol by random
sequences with Nt-bit binary data shared between legitimate
users. The receiver has the new sequence to perform the syn-
chronization and channel estimation while the eavesdropper
can only have a random guess.
1) Feasibility Analysis: The content of the training symbol
has been changed in our scheme. However, the subcarrier’s
carrier frequencies remain the same, therefore, the orthogo-
nality of the OFDM system is not affected. We have shown in
Section VI by a case study that the performance of synchro-
nization and channel estimation is not impacted by the training
symbol resequencing. Therefore, it is feasible to resequence
the training symbol.
2) Security Against Blind Channel Estimation: Eavesdrop-
pers may still use blind channel estimation to attempt to obtain
the channel information in OFDM systems. However, statisti-
cal blind channel estimation suffers from slow convergence
which makes it unsuitable for mobile environments while
deterministic blind channel estimation is computationally com-
plex which will present implementation challenges. The per-
formance of blind channel estimation is greatly affected by the
channel condition and is usually worse than training symbol-
based methods [21]. Therefore, although the eavesdropper
is still able to perform the blind channel estimation to get
some information of the channel, he/she will have to spend a
much longer time to successfully decode the signal. Classical
encryption methods aim to achieve backward secrecy, which
is not impacted by the blind channel estimation here.
IV. ATTACK AND SECURITY ANALYSIS
Wireless communication is vulnerable to passive eavesdrop-
ping due to its broadcast nature. In this section, we use search
space for the brute force attack to quantize the computational
overhead for the eavesdropper, which is the same common tool
used in security analysis for upper layer encryption schemes.
However, PLE is different from upper layer schemes and
introduces some new features. As shown in Fig. 1, there are
three practical considerations for any PLE scheme:
 The way that the key sequence is used to encrypt the
plaintext: PLE schemes use the key sequence differently
by performing the encryption in different physical layer
modulation stages, but other PLE work does not analyze
the effect on the search space of the ciphertext. The
security level of the ciphertext is termed to characterize
the search space of the ciphertext, which is analyzed in
Section IV-A.
 The key generation algorithm adopted to generate the key
sequence: The search space for the key generator is the
commonly used system’s security level. The published
schemes usually adopt a stream cipher or a chaotic map to
generate random key sequence. Once the key generation
method is determined, the system’s security level is fixed
as well. In our scheme, a stream cipher is also used to
generate the key sequence, but the system’s security level
can still be customized, as explained in Section IV-B.
 The data field that is to be protected: Compared to upper
layer encryption, PLE has provided further security as the
MAC header is protected. However, most OFDM PLE
schemes transmit the training symbol in plaintext, which
makes the data linkable and detectable. In our proposed
scheme, in addition to the data part, the training symbol
is resequenced to make the system more secure.
The following security attacks and analysis are based on these
three considerations.
A. Attack on the Ciphertext
In an attack on the ciphertext, an eavesdropper only knows
the encryption algorithm and ciphertext, which means that
he/she has the least amount of information to work with [22].
In our scheme, this attack involves an exhaustive key search
6by trying every possible key/subcarrier permutation until an
intelligible translation of the ciphertext into plaintext is ob-
tained.
1) Attack on the Data Part: If an eavesdropper has already
obtained the ciphertext of the obfuscated data, he/she has to
determine which subcarriers are carrying useful data, and then
search the key bits for decryption. Assuming the eavesdropper
already knows [s; k], then the search space for one data unit,
ssunit, is given as
ssunit = C
k
Nds
2kb; (7)
where Ckn =
n!
(n k)!k! .
The dummy data subcarriers’ locations change for every
data unit, so the search space for the data part ssdata is given
as
ssdata = (ssunit)
Nunit = (CkNds2
kb)
d ld
(Nds k)Rb e: (8)
As the eavesdropper does not know [s; k], he/she has to try
the combinations one by one until the used [s0; k0] is found,
the search space ssdata becomes
ssdata =
s0 1X
s=1
dmaxNdseX
k=1
(CkNds2
kb)
d ld
(Nds k)Rb e
+
k0X
k=1
(CkNds02
kb)
d ld
(Nds0 k)Rb e; (9)
where s0 2 [1; smax] and k0 2 [1; kmax], smax, kmax, and
max are the maximum values that s, k, and  could be,
respectively.
Additionally, because s and k can be adjusted, the search
space is much larger than the search space of fixed s and k,
which makes the scheme more secure.
2) Attack on the Training Symbol: Assuming the eaves-
dropper has synchronized to the transmitter, he/she will have
to try 2Nt times to find the new sequence during channel
estimation. However, the eavesdropper does not know the start
of the physical layer packet, he/she can only have a random
guess. Assuming that the eavesdropper find the start of the
packet after Na attempts, the total search space ssTS is given
as
ssTS = Na2
Nt : (10)
3) Ciphertext Attack Summary: In order to decrypt the
physical layer packet, an eavesdropper will have to acquire
knowledge of the new training symbol and then decrypt the
data part. As the eavesdropper does not know which training
symbol the legitimate users are using, the attack on the training
symbol is a ciphertext only attack. So for the entire physical
layer packet, the search space of our SOTSR scheme is
ssSOTSRPLE = ssTS  ssdata
= Na2
Nt(
s0 1X
s=1
dmaxNdseX
k=1
(CkNds2
kb)
d ld
(Nds k)Rb e
+
k0X
k=1
(CkNds02
kb)
d ld
(Nds0 k)Rb e): (11)
B. Attack on the Key Generator
In an attack on the key generator, the eavesdropper tries
to break down the key generator with an Ns-bit seed stream
cipher using an exhaustive key search. The search space is
ss0KG = 2
Ns : (12)
In our proposed scheme, besides obtaining the seed for the
key generator, an eavesdropper also has to attempt Na times
to locate the start of the data symbols and find out [s; k] in
order to carry out the decryption correctly. For every seed,
the eavesdropper has to try Nask times, the total search space
ssKG can be given as
ssKG = Nask2
Ns : (13)
As s and k are preshared between transmitter and receiver,
the width of s and k are determined by smax and kmax,
respectively. So the security improvement is at a cost of adding
(dlog2 smaxe + dlog2 kmaxe) more bits to the secret infor-
mation sharing between transmitter and receiver. This secret
information increase is postulated worthwhile. For example,
for smax = 16, kmax = 128, s = 4, k = 4, Na = 1,
and Ns = 80, the shared secret information is increased
by dlog2 16e+dlog2 128e80 = 13:75%. However the search space
ssKG is enhanced by 1 4 4 = 1600%, which dramatically
increases the eavesdropper’s required computational overhead.
Also it is worth noting that due to the training symbol
resequencing, the system is Na times more secure, without
adding any overhead to the secret information sharing.
For most other encryption schemes, after the key generation
algorithm is determined, the security level of the system is
fixed as well. In our scheme, the system’s security level can
still be customized by changing the values of s and k, which
is another reason to make these values adjustable. This feature
is quite useful, as most encryption schemes will adopt off-the-
shelf key generation algorithms, but our scheme can still offer
some options after the key generation algorithm is selected.
It seems that the value of ssKG is much smaller than the
value of ssSOTSRPLE . However, the attack on the key generator is
more complicated than the attack on the ciphertext. The attack
on the ciphertext involves trying different key sequences to
determine some readable plaintext by only knowing the ci-
phertext. But the attack on the key generator is to try different
seeds for the key generator and then use the generated key
sequence to decrypt the ciphertext. In addition, the information
known by the eavesdropper and the purpose of the attack is
also different for these two attacks. Therefore, these two search
spaces are not comparable.
C. Attacks Based on the MAC Address
Encryption schemes implemented at MAC layer leave the
MAC header unprotected, making the system vulnerable to
attacks based on the MAC address. The proposed encryption
scheme is implemented at the physical layer, so the entire
MAC packet is encrypted, including the MAC header. More-
over due to our training symbol resequencing, the eavesdrop-
per cannot perform synchronization and channel estimation
correctly in real-time, and therefore does not know where the
7MAC header is. Thus the system is very robust to attacks based
on the MAC address.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND COMPARISON
In this section, comparison with other OFDM PLE schemes
is carried out by evaluating the performance of search space,
key rate and complexity. The search space is one of the most
critical metrics for any encryption scheme as it determines the
raw processing power (brute force) required by an eavesdrop-
per, while the key rate and complexity determine how easy
the scheme is to implement.
A. Search Space
Search space is not the final parameter describing the
computational complexity for the brute force attack, which
also depends on the computation overhead required for each
round of the attack. As PLE schemes protect the data at
different modulation stages, the eavesdropper may carry out
part of the receiving procedure and then be faced to decrypt
the data, as illustrated in Fig. 5. When the training symbol
is unchanged, the eavesdroppers can detect the signal arrival
and only need to store one complete received waveform. The
eavesdropper then can carry out part of the receiving procedure
and search for the right key. For example, for modulation
symbols rotation-based schemes, the eavesdropper can perform
the procedure as far as to the FFT operation then it will be
faced to guess the correct angle for each constellation symbol.
Conventional XOR encryption happens at the first stage of the
physical layer modulation by XOR-ing the source binary data
with key sequence so it does not randomize the transmitted
waveform, thus the eavesdropper can perform the entire re-
ceiving procedure. However, in our scheme, due to the training
symbol resequencing, the eavesdropper is not able to perform
synchronization and channel estimation correctly, he/she will
then have to store all of the received signal waveform, and be
always required to repeat the entire receiving procedure when
trying each possible key sequence. This significantly increases
the computational overhead for the eavesdropper. However,
it is difficult to quantize the number of the computational
operations for each round of the attack, therefore, we still use
search space to analyze the security level of the system as it
provides a quantitative description of numbers of the attempts
required.
1) Search Space of the Entire Packet: Conventional en-
cryption is implemented in the upper layers, e.g., MAC layer.
The search space for MAC layer encryption by exhaustive key
search is denoted as ssMAC. All the OFDM PLE schemes add
further protection to the MAC packet, i.e., the data part of the
physical layer packet. The search space can be written as
sstotal = ssPLE  ssMAC (14)
For most OFDM PLE schemes, only the data part are
protected, the search space can be written as
ssPLE2 = ssdata (15)
In Dzung’s work [12], the author encrypts the training
symbol by rotating it based on the key stream. When the
TABLE I
SEARCH SPACE OF THE DATA PART FOR DIFFERENT PLE SCHEMES
ssdata ss
scr
data ss
rot
data
1:18 10141 (48!)34 2:47 10173
TABLE II
SYSTEM SETTING
ld Nd R b [s0; k0]  max Nbps
800 48 1/2 1 [4; 4] 2% 10% 2
eavesdropper tries to find the encrypted training symbol, as
he/she knows the standard training symbol, it is a known
plaintext attack. This means the eavesdropper obtains the
ciphertext and also knows the corresponding plaintext. The
search space for the entire packet is
ssPLE3 = ssTS + ssdata: (16)
While the training symbol encryption adds some additional
protection to the system, the improvement is quite limited.
Our scheme’s search space is much larger, which means it
is much more secure. Compared to the encrypted training
symbol scheme, our scheme even has a slightly simpler
training symbol generation method. This is because we used
the sequence from the key generator as the training symbol
directly without any encryption operations required.
2) Search Space of the Data Part: All the PLE schemes
enhance the system’s security by protecting the data part of
the physical layer packet. The search space of the data part
ssdata for our scheme has been given in (9).
Scrambling-based PLE schemes [8]–[11] rearrange the data
positions by a scrambling matrix S. For each OFDM symbol,
there are Nd! different permutations. Therefore, the search
space of the entire data part can be given as
ssscrdata = (Nd!)
d ldNdRb e: (17)
Modulation symbols rotation-based schemes [12]–[14] ro-
tate the constellation symbols by an angle determined by the
number of bits per modulation symbol, Nbps, e.g., in the work
of Reilly and Kanter [14], 8 bits are used for each rotation,
thus Nbps = 8. For each constellation symbol, there are 2Nbps
possible choices. Thus, for the entire packet, the search space
can be written as
ssrotdata = (2
Nbps)
d ldNdRb eNd : (18)
The search space increases with the data length. An example
of the search space of the data part for different PLE schemes
are given in Table I while the system setting is shown in
Table II. Assuming the eavesdropper is equipped with a
powerful machine which can process 1 million decryptions per
microsecond [22], it will take the eavesdropper 3:74  10121
years to crack our scheme! This is achieved only at a tradeoff
of 2% decrease in the bandwidth.
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B. Key Rate
The key rate is an essential factor in encryption. Key se-
quence is generated by stream cipher or chaotic map. A higher
key rate requires more computational complexity to realize.
Wireless technologies are used widely in mobile devices which
are sensitive to hardware and power. The output speed of
the key generator can become a major system bottleneck
whenever a mobile device attempts high data rate encrypted
communications.
In wireless communications, the system will adjust the
coding rate and mapping scheme according to the channel’s
SNR to maintain a low bit error rate (BER), leading to different
data rate. For example, there are four mapping schemes used
in IEEE 802.11 OFDM, i.e., BPSK, QPSK, 16-QAM, and 64-
QAM, so the value of b could be 1, 2, 4, and 6, respectively.
The coding rate R of IEEE 802.11 OFDM could be 1/2, 2/3,
3/4. The data rate, DR, can be given as
DR = DRminb
R
1=2
= 2DRminRb; (19)
where DRmin is the minimum data rate of the system when it
is coded with a rate of R = 1=2 and BPSK mapped. For the
simplicity of analysis, DRmin is normalized to 1.
The nk-bit key is required to encrypt nd-bit source data. The
key-to-data ratio can be defined as the ratio between them, and
is also a ratio between the key rate, KR, and the data rate DR,
which is given as
 =
nk
nd
=
KR
DR
: (20)
In our scheme, the key-to-data ratio can vary with [s; k].
Key bits with a length of k(dlog2(Nds)e + b) can encrypt
(Nds k)Rb data bits, thus the key-to-data ratio of our SOTSR
scheme is given as
SOTSR =
k(dlog2(Nds)e+ b)
(Nds  k)Rb : (21)
The key rate can be calculated as
KRSOTSR = DRSOTSR =
2k(dlog2(Nds)e+ b)
(Nds  k) DRmin: (22)
In scrambling-based PLE schemes [8]–[11], if the index
of the scrambling matrix is generated by a stream cipher,
for each subcarrier index, it needs dlog2(Nd)e bits. The key
bits required for the entire matrix are at least dlog2(Nd)eNd.
Therefore, the minimum key-to-data ratio of scrambling-based
schemes can be written as
scr =
dlog2(Nd)eNd
NdRb
=
dlog2(Nd)e
Rb
: (23)
And the key rate is given as
KRscr = DRscr = 2dlog2(Nd)e  DRmin: (24)
In modulation symbols rotation-based schemes [12]–[14],
the key sequence is used to generate the rotation angle. The
key-to-data ratio of their system can be given as
rot =
Nbps
Rb
: (25)
The key rate of these schemes can be calculated as
KRrot = DRrot = 2Nbps  DRmin: (26)
Key rates of different schemes are shown in Fig. 6, with
an OFDM system running at a coding rate R = 3=4 and
64-QAM mapping scheme (b = 6). For scrambling-based
schemes, KRscr = 12; for modulation symbols rotation-based
schemes, KRrot = 4 when Nbps = 2 and KRrot = 16 when
Nbps = 8. Our scheme can be configured to have a smaller key
rate by adjusting the values of s and k. It is also worth noting
that the key rate of our scheme is usually smaller than the
data rate, which means the key-to-data ratio SOTSR is smaller
than 1.
As our scheme can adjust the key rate by changing the
encryption parameters, the security can be scaled according
to the hardware availability, thus it is especially useful for
resource limited devices. With larger s and k, the search
space will be higher and the system will be more secure. For
example, as shown in (13), ssKG increases linearly with s and
k. However, the security improvement is at a cost of more
keys, and thereof more computational resources, as larger s
and k result in higher a key rate.
C. Complexity
It is important to consider the hardware implications of
any change both in terms of the hardware increase and the
impact on the propagation delay which will affect the speed
of operation. A coarse computational complexity estimation
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has been carried out and our scheme is much less computa-
tionally complex, compared to some other published OFDM
encryption schemes.
As the data encryption and subcarrier obfuscation of the data
part, i.e., Algorithm 1, is the most time consuming process in
our scheme, therefore, only the complexity of Algorithm 1
is considered here to simplify the analysis. The encryption
complexity of our SOTSR scheme is given by
 SOTSR =M1 +NunitM2
=M1 + d ld
(Nds  k)RbeM2
M1 + M2
(Nds  k)
ld
Rb
; (27)
where M1 and M2 are the operation numbers introduced by
our scheme outside and inside the loop of Algorithm 1 (i.e.,
lines 1 to 4 and lines 6 to 16, respectively). In our scheme,
the operation required for decryption process is similar to the
operation in the encryption process, so the decryption has
almost the same complexity.
Scrambling-based PLE schemes [8]–[11] require matrix
operations, including matrix multiplication, determinant, di-
vision, inversion, which have a high computation complexity.
For example, matrix inversion has a complexity of O(N3mat),
where Nmat is the matrix size which for OFDM, will represent
the same as IFFT/FFT size NIFFT. For a data packet with the
same length ld, there will be d ldNdRbe OFDM symbols. For each
OFDM symbol, the data is scrambled in either frequency or
time domain, so there will be d ldNdRbe rounds of encryptions
and decryptions. Scrambling-based schemes need to calculate
the inverse of the scrambling matrix in the decryption pro-
cess. If we consider the computational complexity of matrix
inversion only, the decryption complexity of scrambling-based
schemes is written as
 scr = d ld
NdRb
eO(NIFFT3)  O(NIFFT
3)
NdRb
ld: (28)
As there are some guard bands in OFDM, Nd  NIFFT. For
example, in IEEE 802.11 OFDM, the IFFT/FFT size is 64,
but only 48 of the inputs are used for data subcarriers. Thus
we have
 scr  O(N
3
d )
Nd
ld
Rb
: (29)
Modulation symbols rotation-based schemes [12]–[14] per-
form the encryption by multiplying the constellation symbols
with a factor generated from the key sequence. The complexity
can be given as
 rot = d ld
NdRb
eNd  ld
Rb
: (30)
Multiplication is not at bit level but at data values, which could
make the implementation relatively more complex. However,
the overall complexity of modulation symbols rotation-based
schemes is not high as it only introduces a multiplication.
Note that in our scheme, all the operations are non-complex,
so the factor of ldRb in  
SOTSR is much smaller than its factor in
 scr, i.e., the complexity of scrambling-based schemes [8]–
[11], which means our scheme has a lower complexity and
thus is more suitable for resource limited devices. The gray
modules in Fig. 4 are introduced for encryption and decryption
which cost extra hardware. All the operations in our scheme
occur before mapping and thus at the bit level, which makes
for a comparatively more hardware efficient solution. The
encryption process only requires XOR and bit stuffing while
the decryption process only requires XOR and bit removal.
XOR is used in conventional XOR encryption as well. The
additional resource for bit stuffing and bit removal consists of
multiplexers and control circuits, which is not a big overhead.
TS Resequencing module does not require extra hardware as
it uses the sequence from the Key Generator directly. TS
Generation transforms the resequenced training symbol from
frequency domain to time domain, which requires an IFFT
module or could be designed to share the IFFT module in the
data stream modulation. Therefore, the extra hardware intro-
duced by our scheme is relatively small. The implementation
of our scheme is left for the future work by when a detailed
design will be undertaken and circuit area will be precisely
computed.
D. Summary
In this section, we evaluated and compared the performance
of different PLE schemes in terms of search space, key
rate and complexity. As summarized in Table III, the overall
performance of our scheme outperforms other PLE schemes.
In this paper, we proposed to protect the entire OFDM
physical layer packet by subcarrier obfuscation of the data part
and the training symbol resequencing, which work together to
enhance the security of the OFDM transmission.
Data part is the main part of the OFDM physical layer
packet, which is protected by subcarrier obfuscation. As
analyzed in Section IV-A and Section V-A2, subcarrier ob-
fuscation does not compromise the security of the ciphertext.
In addition, the introduction of two adjustable parameters, s
and k, offers us the capacity to customize the search space of
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TABLE III
PERFORMANCE COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT PLE SCHEMES
Our Scheme Scrambling-based Scheme Modulation Symbols Rotation-Based Scheme
Search Space (ssdata) High High High
Key Rate (KR) Usually low, adjustable High Usually high, adjustable
Complexity ( ) Low High Low
ciphertext (11), the search space of key generator (13), and the
key rate (22). Finally, subcarrier obfuscation is a relatively low
complexity technique, which is suitable for resource limited
devices.
There are usually much less training symbol subcarriers than
data subcarriers. In terms of the contribution to the search
space, training symbol resequencing may seem to be less
essential than subcarrier obfuscation. However, as analyzed in
Section V-A, the training symbol resequencing can randomize
the physical transmission, which makes it much more difficult
for the eavesdroppers to carry out the synchronization and
channel estimation correctly. In addition, this technique does
not require complicated implementation, therefore, the security
improvement is achieved in a very effective way. Finally,
training symbol resequencing is independent of subcarrier
obfuscation and can be implemented with other data part
protection schemes such as modulation symbols rotation-based
schemes and scrambling-based schemes.
VI. CASE STUDY: IMPLEMENTATION IN IEEE 802.11
OFDM SYSTEM
Other research has reported their proposed schemes in a
generalized manner, without reference to particular wireless
systems or consideration to the protocol details. However PLE
is dependent on the transmission scheme used, e.g. structure
of training symbol, format of the physical layer packet, etc.
Therefore, a case study is carried out here by implementing
our encryption scheme according to the IEEE 802.11 OFDM
protocol, in order to offer some insights on how our encryption
scheme interacts with the transmission protocol.
IEEE 802.11 OFDM is widely used in commercial elec-
tronic devices. Although MAC layer encryption schemes such
as WEP and WPA provide some protection, it still remains
vulnerable to attacks [23]. Therefore, we propose to enhance
the security performance by applying our PLE scheme to the
standard.
The algorithm is prototyped using MATLAB simulation.
The model is implemented according to the IEEE 802.11
OFDM protocol and is the same as shown in Fig. 4. It
demonstrates that as long as the synchronization and chan-
nel estimation are correctly performed, the encryption and
decryption of the data part will not impact the BER. In
this section, first the related IEEE 802.11 OFDM protocol
is introduced. The SIGNAL field, DATA field and LTS are
protected differently due to their specific structure. The reason
that short training symbol (STS) is not encrypted is also
explained.
A. IEEE 802.11 OFDM Protocol
The frame format of IEEE 802.11 OFDM physical layer
convergence protocol (PLCP) protocol data unit (PPDU), i.e.,
the physical layer packet, is shown in Fig. 7. It consists of
the PLCP preamble, the SIGNAL field and the DATA field.
The PLCP preamble is composed of ten identical STS t1, t2,
. . . , t10 and 2.5 LTS GI2, T1, T2, whose structure is the block
type as shown in Fig. 2(a). The STS is used for automatic
gain control (AGC), signal detection and coarse frequency
synchronization etc., whilst the LTS is used for data symbol
alignment and channel estimation. In the time domain, each
STS is 16 samples and each LTS is 64 samples.
The bit assignment of the SIGNAL field is shown in Fig. 7.
The RATE subfield defines the coding rate R (1/2, 2/3 or
3/4) and mapping scheme (BPSK, QPSK, 16-QAM or 64-
QAM) used for the DATA field while the LENGTH subfield
indicates the number of octets in the PLCP service data unit
(PSDU). The SIGNAL field is always mapped with BPSK
and uses convolutional coding at rate R = 1=2. The DATA
field contains the SERVICE subfield, PSDU, the Tail bits and
the Pad bits. The PSDU is the MAC frame passed from MAC
layer requesting the physical layer to transmit. The DATA field
is convolutionally encoded and mapped using the parameters
defined in the SIGNAL field.
B. Data Encryption and Subcarrier Obfuscation
The data part of the PPDU consists of SIGNAL and DATA
field, which are protected differently due to their specific
structures.
1) SIGNAL Field Encryption: The SIGNAL field is used
to decode the DATA field as it contains the coding rate,
mapping scheme and length information of the DATA field.
The SIGNAL field is always convolutionally coded with a
rate of R = 1=2 and BPSK mapped. In order to make the
system more secure, a 24-bit key is generated to encrypt the
SIGNAL field using an XOR operation. As the SIGNAL field
forms a complete OFDM symbol after convolutional coding
and mapping, no dummy data is inserted into the SIGNAL
field thus ensuring minimal change to the current protocol.
2) DATA Field Protection: DATA field is the main data part
of the PPDU and protected using our proposed data encryption
and subcarrier obfuscation scheme. When the DATA field is
modulated, the number of OFDM symbols is:
NOFDM = d8NPSDU + 16 + 6
NdRb
e; (31)
where NPSDU is the number of bytes in the PSDU, Nd = 48
in IEEE 802.11 OFDM.
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Fig. 7. IEEE 802.11 OFDM PPDU frame format [24] (For simplicity, guard interval of the OFDM data symbols is not shown in the figure)
As the LENGTH subfield in the SIGNAL field is 12
bits, theoretically the PSDU can be up to 4095 bytes long.
According to the standard, the fragmentation threshold is 2346
bytes [24], which limits the maximum MAC frame size. The
mean MAC packet length is 1500 bytes; when the DATA
field is modulated using 64-QAM with 3/4 coding rate, there
are approximately d 15008+16+6483=46 e = 56 OFDM symbols.
Thus when the DATA field is modulated using a lower order
mapping scheme and a smaller coding rate, there will be more
OFDM symbols. Therefore, it is feasible to group several
OFDM symbols together to form a data unit.
C. LTS Resequencing
The frequency domain value of the LTS in IEEE 802.11
OFDM is shown in (6), which is a 52-bit long sequence
modulated by BPSK. The time domain values of the LTS can
be calculated by applying an IFFT operation to the frequency
domain values. In order to make the OFDM transmission
unrecoverable to the eavesdropper, the LTS is resequenced
with a 52-bit key sequence, rather than using the sequence
defined in the standard. This sequence may be changed from
system to system for even greater security. As the legitimate
receiver has the same new LTS sequence as the transmitter,
he/she can synchronize and estimate the channel correctly
while the eavesdropper can only have a random guess, thus
providing an additional level of security. In this section, we
show that the LTS resequencing still retains the functionality
to allow the normal synchronization and channel estimation.
1) Effect on Data Symbol Alignment: The LTS is used to
identify the start of the data symbols at the physical layer
packets by calculating the cross correlation coefficient, Clts,
using the expression below:
Clts(n) =
NLTS 1X
i=0
r(n+ i)lts(i); (32)
where r(n+i) is the received signal, lts(i) is the time domain
LTS, NLTS is the length of the LTS, and () is the conjugate
operation [25]. When Clts(n) reaches its maximum value,
which is proportional to the value of
PNLTS 1
i=0 jlts(i)j2, then
n is the index of the start of the LTS and n + 128 is the
start of the data symbols (the two LTSs’ length is 128). An
eavesdropper does not have any knowledge of the new lts,
so he/she cannot correctly identify the start of the data and
therefore can only have a random guess.
As the LTS is BPSK modulated in the frequency domain,
resequencing it will only change the sign of its elements. Thus
the resequenced LTS, LTSnew(n), can be written as
LTSnew(n) = ( 1)tLTS(n); t = 0; 1; (33)
where LTS(n) is the frequency domain LTS in the standard.
According to Parseval’s theorem, we have
NIFFT 1X
i=0
jx(i)j2 = 1
NIFFT
NIFFT 1X
n=0
jX(n)j2; (34)
where X(n) =
PNIFFT 1
i=0 x(i)e
 j2in=NIFFT , n = 0, 1, ...,
NIFFT   1.
Then
NIFFT 1X
i=0
jltsnew(i)j2 = 1
NIFFT
NIFFT 1X
n=0
jLTSnew(n)j2
=
1
NIFFT
NIFFT 1X
n=0
j( 1)tLTS(n)j2
=
NIFFT 1X
i=0
jlts(i)j2; (35)
where ltsnew(i) is the new time domain LTS. Thus, although
the LTS is resequenced, the value of
PNLTS 1
i=0 jlts(i)j2 will
remain the same, and so will the maximum value of Clts(n).
Some simulation results of the symbol alignment perfor-
mance when the system uses the standard LTS and rese-
quenced LTS are shown in Fig. 8. As there are 2.5 LTSs in
the preamble, the index of the first peak is the start of the
LTS. Both systems have two clear peaks and the peaks of
the LTS resequenced system match those of the standard LTS
system, indicating that LTS resequencing does not impact the
performance of the symbol alignment.
The value Clts(n) is compared with a threshold to detect the
appearance of the maximum correlation coefficient and hence
detect the start of the data symbols. However, as it is shown in
the above analysis and simulation, the maximum correlation
coefficient will stay the same so the threshold value does not
require dynamic adjusting. The legitimate user can perform
the data symbol alignment correctly with the knowledge of
the resequenced LTS.
2) Effect on Channel Estimation: The LTS is also used to
estimate the channel. The least-square (LS) channel estimation
method is used widely due to its simplicity [21], which is also
adopted in our model. The mean-square error (MSE) of the
LS channel estimation is inversely proportional to the SNR,
which is not affected by the content of the training symbol,
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as shown in Fig. 9 and Fig. 10. Therefore LTS resequencing
will not impact channel estimation.
D. STS Encryption
The STS is not encrypted or resequenced in our proposed
scheme. The STS is used for signal detection, AGC and coarse
frequency offset estimation, etc. in IEEE 802.11 OFDM. The
receiver carries out these functions based on the periodicity of
the STS and through calculation of the delay and autocorre-
lation of the received signal, that is
Csts(n) =
Nwin 1X
i=0
r(n+ i)r(n+ i+NSTS)
; (36)
where NSTS is the length of the STS, Nwin is the length
of the search window, and Csts(n) is the autocorrelation
coefficient [25].
The receiver does not have to know the time domain and/or
frequency domain values of the STS to calculate Csts(n).
As long as the 10 STSs are the same, the receiver can
perform the delay and autocorrelation correctly, and so can
the eavesdropper.
Moreover, the OFDM system’s transmission power is much
larger than the noise power, so the eavesdropper can detect the
signal arrival by the increase in the received signal’s power.
Therefore, in any case it is difficult to prevent the eavesdropper
from detecting the signal in OFDM transmission systems.
However, transmitting the STS in plaintext (as is currently
the case) does not compromise the system’s security very
much, because the eavesdropper will still have to decrypt
the subsequent LTS, the SIGNAL and the DATA fields as
described above.
E. Summary
In this section, we implemented our encryption scheme to
the IEEE 802.11 OFDM system, and presented the design
considerations of how to apply the scheme to a specific
communication protocol. For example, special attention has
been paid to the SIGNAL field and STS due to their special
data structure and usage.
As the above analysis shows, the training symbol rese-
quencing does not interrupt the normal synchronization and
channel estimation process, and the DATA field is suitable
to be protected by data encryption and subcarrier obfus-
cation. Therefore, our encryption scheme is applicable for
IEEE 802.11 OFDM systems and provides additional security
enhancement at the physical layer.
VII. CONCLUSION
A new OFDM PLE scheme using subcarrier obfuscation
and training symbol resequencing is proposed in this paper.
The OFDM transmissions are more random due to subcarrier
obfuscation through the insertion of dummy data transmitted
in several subcarriers. Two encryption parameters, s and k,
are introduced for the subcarrier obfuscation. Although the
key sequence is used differently from the conventional PLE
schemes, it is shown that this does not compromise the
security level by analyzing each of the search spaces using an
exhaustive key search. In the proposed scheme, the encryption
parameters can be made adjustable, and it is shown that this
greatly improves the security level at a cost of a relatively
small overhead of the secret information sharing between
transmitter and receiver. Another key feature of our scheme
is the resequencing of the training symbol which means the
protection of the entire physical layer packet. This obscures
and encrypts both the packet contents and the location of the
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MAC frame, totally preventing the system from the attacks
based on the MAC address.
Our proposed scheme has a good performance in terms of
search space, key rate and complexity. The search space is
large enough to resist brute force attack. The key rate can be
varied by adjusting the encryption parameters and usually can
be made small. Using a coarse computational complexity esti-
mation, it is shown how the scheme has a low complexity and
therefore is especially suitable for resource limited devices. A
case study has been carried out to IEEE 802.11 OFDM system
to show the design consideration to apply a general OFDM
encryption scheme to a specific communication protocol. The
practical hardware implementation of the scheme will be the
focus of our future work.
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